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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The anomalous nature of punitive or exemplary damage awards in 
civil cases has often been the subject of comment in English 
jurisprudence and in the decisions of courts in other common law 
jurisdictions within the British Commonwealth.  Thus, in the leading 
opinion of the House of Lords decision in Rookes v. Barnard,2 Lord 
Devlin observed that the recognition of punitive damages, which he 
favored to a limited degree, involved “admitting into the civil law a 
 
 *  Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.  2. [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.). 
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principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal.”3  The lack of 
procedural safeguards normally associated with punishment, the 
enrichment of the plaintiff rather than the state by the imposition of a 
civil fine, and the inherent difficulty of quantifying such awards with 
resulting doctrinal uncertainty have conspired, in the English tradition at 
least, to justify caution and restraint in the making of such awards.  
Indeed, in Rookes v. Barnard itself, the English law of punitive damages 
approached the brink of extinction.  Such awards were preserved in that 
case for application only in tort law and essentially in only two types of 
cases.  The first type included claims arising from oppressive, arbitrary, 
or unconstitutional acts of public servants, or, as Lord Devlin described 
it, “the arbitrary and outrageous use of executive power.”4  The second 
type of cases included those in which the defendant’s conduct was 
calculated to make a profit that exceeded the compensation available to 
the plaintiff.5  Until quite recently, the rules set forth in Rookes v. 
Barnard settled the boundaries for punitive damage awards in English 
law. 
At the same time, however, some support for the making of such 
awards can be found.  Lord Devlin himself expressed the view that 
punitive damage awards played a very useful role in the two categories 
of cases identified in Rookes v. Barnard.6  Further, the restriction of 
English awards to these two categories of cases has attracted criticism 
over the years.  More particularly, the English Law Commission, in its 
report entitled Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, 
recommended a much broader potential availability of such awards in 
the context of tort law and in claims arising from equitable wrongdoing.7  
Even for such enthusiasts, however, the extension of damage awards into 
the context of claims for damages for breach of contract, where no tort 
has been committed, have typically been considered to be beyond the 
pale. 
Thus, the Law Commission itself recommended against extending 
awards of punitive damages into the contractual context.  The Commission 
offered a number of reasons in support of this recommendation, some more 
convincing, one might think, than others.  Thus, “a contract is a private 
 
 3. Id. at 1226. 
 4. Id. at 1223; see also Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1077–78 (H.L.) (noting that the doctrine also applies to police and other local authorities improperly exercising rights of search or arrest without warrant). 
 5. Rookes, [1964] A.C. at 1226. 
 6. Id.  7. LAW COMM’N, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES 184–88 (1997) [hereinafter AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES].  For a critical assessment, see Peter Jaffey, The Law Commission Report on Aggravated, 
Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, 61 MOD. L. REV. 860 (1998). 
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arrangement in which parties negotiate rights and duties, whereas the 
duties which obtain under the law of tort are imposed by law; it can 
accordingly be argued that the notion of state punishment is more readily 
applicable to the latter than to the former.”8  It further argued that “the 
need for certainty is perceived to be greater in relation to contract than 
tort,” thus rendering the discretionary features of exemplary damage 
awards unattractive.9  The Commission noted that exemplary damages 
had never been awarded for breach of contract in the past, that the 
awarding of exemplary damages would tend to discourage efficient 
breach of contract, and that contract, unlike tort law, typically involved 
pecuniary rather than nonpecuniary losses with respect to which 
exemplary awards were less appropriate.10 
Other considerations may be thought to weigh against punitive 
damages in contract.  It can be argued that, to the extent that punitive 
damage awards punish defendants who have inflicted anxiety and other 
mental suffering on plaintiffs, such injuries can be more directly and 
appropriately addressed by awards of compensatory damages relating to 
such injuries.  Farnsworth suggests that American courts also exhibit a 
reluctance to grant awards of punitive damages in the context of pure 
contractual breach, and offers the proposition that damages for breach of 
contract are essentially compensatory in nature as an explanation for this 
phenomenon.11 
Against this background, it may occasion some surprise, even to 
Canadian observers, that the Supreme Court of Canada has blessed, in 
recent years, punitive damages awards in pure breach of contract cases.  
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this development in its recent and leading 
decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.12  As the majority opinion of 
the Court noted in that case: “Critics of punitive damages warn against 
an ‘Americanization’ of our law that, if adopted, would bring the 
administration of justice in this country into disrepute.”13  Indeed, it is 
probably true that quite apart from specialists with a particular interest in 
this topic, Canadians more generally have an impression of American 
experience with punitive damages awards that is not viewed altogether 
 
 8. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 7, at 118. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  11. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 194–98 (3d ed. 2004).  12. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 596. 
 13. Id. at 618–19 (per Binnie, J.). 
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favorably.  Canadian appreciation of American experience results, no 
doubt, in large measure from media coverage of high-profile American 
cases.  Many readers of the Canadian daily press would be aware, for 
example, of the 1994 award in the Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 
P.T.S., Inc., where an Alabama jury awarded the plaintiff $2.7 million in 
punitive damages at trial.14  The plaintiff had suffered burns from 
opening a cup of scaldingly hot McDonald’s coffee and spilling it on her 
lap in the front seat of an automobile.15  The fact that the trial judge 
reduced the jury award to a much less impressive $480,00016 would not 
have significantly reduced its impact on a Canadian reader as evidence 
of a legal system out of control. 
Often these cases have had a Canadian dimension.  The remarkable result 
in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.17 led the defendant Texaco to liquidate its 
interest in its Canadian subsidiary, Texaco Canada, in order to pay the 
award.  Canadian opera fans were temporarily distressed by the loss of 
Texaco Canada’s sponsorship of a favorite Saturday afternoon radio 
program.  A Canadian funeral home chain, the Loewen Group, Inc., was 
brought close to insolvency in 1996 by a $500 million award in punitive 
damages granted by a Mississippi jury.18  The claim concerned Loewen’s 
alleged refusal to perform an agreement to buy two funeral homes from 
the former Mayor of Biloxi.19  The properties in question had a value of 
approximately $8.5 million.  To avoid bankruptcy, the Loewen Group 
eventually settled the claim for an amount variously reported in the 
range of $150 to $175 million.20 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in Pilot Insurance, the Supreme 
Court of Canada acknowledged that Canadian critics of punitive 
damages awards draw support from their understanding, or perhaps 
 
 14. No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).  This case, together with BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), were referred to by Justice Binnie as decisions relied upon by critics of the American law on punitive damages.  See Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 618. 
 15. See Debra Lyn Bassett, “I Lost at Trial—In the Court of Appeals!”: The 
Expanding Power of the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1179 n.315 (2001) (discussing the facts of Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that comity prevents federal courts from blocking a state judgment awarding punitive damages); see also Comment, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court 
Proceedings, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 767 (1986) (providing analysis of the federalism issue raised by Pennzoil); JAMES SHANNON, TEXACO AND THE $10 BILLION JURY (1988).  18. The case is described in MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, 
AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH 158–59 (1998).  See also Jonathan Harr, The Burial, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70; Barrie McKenna, Loewen Action Called a Threat to 
U.S. Justice, CAN. BUS., Nov. 25, 1998, at B7 (providing description of settlement).  19. BOOT, supra note 18, at 158. 
 20. Id. at 159. 
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misunderstanding, of American experience.  It is also not surprising that 
in this case the Supreme Court attempted to craft an approach to the 
awarding of punitive damages that would avoid the worst excesses of 
American experience.  As we shall see, however, whether the Court 
succeeded in attaining that laudable objective remains, as yet, unclear. 
II.  RECOGNITION 
The unlikely story of the Canadian embrace of punitive damages for 
breach of contract arose in the context of wrongful dismissal cases, and, 
more particularly, in the context of dismissal with an imputation.  In an 
employment contract of indefinite duration there is, of course, an 
implied term requiring the employer to give reasonable notice to the 
employee of an impending dismissal.  Thus, in the typical wrongful 
dismissal case, the employee who has not received reasonable notice 
sues for damages for breach of that implied term.  Where the wrongful 
dismissal is accompanied with false allegations of employee misconduct 
or other forms of harassment, the courts may consider awarding 
additional damages to an employee who claims to have been injured by 
conduct of this kind.  The traditional response of English law, followed 
until recent years in common law Canada, was that no such damages 
claim was available on a breach of contract theory.  In the 1909 decision 
in Addis v. Gramophone Co., the House of Lords held that, in a wrongful 
dismissal claim, no compensation can be awarded for the manner of 
dismissal.21  To the extent that the employee had suffered injuries as a 
result of, for example, defamation, the employee should be left with 
whatever tort remedies might be available.22 
The novel idea that punitive damages might be awarded in the 
wrongful dismissal context appears to have been first mooted in a 
decision of Justice Linden—perhaps by no coincidence, one of Canada’s 
leading torts scholars23—in Brown v. Waterloo Regional Board of 
Commissioners of Police.24  Justice Linden opined that although exemplary 
damages for breach of contract were not available in the particular 
circumstances of the case, there was no general rule against awarding 
 
 21. [1909] A.C. 488 (H.L.). 
 22. Id.  23. ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW (7th ed.  2001).  24. [1982] 136 D.L.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. High Ct.) vard [1983] 150 D.L.R. (3d) 729 (Ont. C.A.). 
MCCAMUS.DOC 8/21/2019  11:56 AM 
 
1496 
such damages.25  The point was taken up by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Vorvis v. Insurance Corp.26 in 1989.  The Court again offered 
the view that although such an award would be inappropriate on the facts 
of that case, punitive damages could indeed be awarded in the context of 
a claim for breach of contract damages.27 
The claim in Vorvis was for a wrongful dismissal.  The plaintiff lawyer 
was abruptly terminated by his employer, a government automobile 
insurance plan, without cause and without reasonable notice.  Prior to the 
dismissal, the plaintiff’s supervisor, who considered the plaintiff to be 
conscientious to a fault, engaged in detailed and, perhaps, heavy-handed 
supervision of the plaintiff’s work.28  In addition to claiming wages that 
he would have earned during a reasonable notice period, the plaintiff 
sought aggravated and punitive damages.29  The Supreme Court majority 
held that “while it may be very unusual to do so, punitive damages may 
be awarded in cases of breach of contract.”30  For such an award to be 
appropriate, the conduct of the defaulting party must be “of such a 
nature as to be deserving of punishment because of its harsh, vindictive, 
reprehensible and malicious nature.”31  Again, “the conduct must be 
extreme in its nature and such that by any reasonable standard it is 
deserving of full condemnation and punishment.”32  However, although 
the facts of the case indicated that the supervisor had treated the plaintiff 
“in a most offensive manner,”33 the conduct was not of such a nature as 
to justify an award of punitive damages.34 
Three aspects of the Court’s reasoning in the Vorvis case are of a 
particular interest in the present context.  First, the majority opinion of 
Justice McIntyre indicated a clear awareness of the anomalous or 
“peculiar” nature of punitive damages awarded “in the absence of the 
procedural protections for the defendant [which are] always present in 
criminal trials where punishment is ordinarily awarded . . . .”35  Further, 
Justice McIntyre indicated an awareness of the problematic aspects of 
extending punitive damages awards from their then existing home of tort 
actions to breach of contract cases.  In a tort case, the defendant is 
“under a legal duty to use care not to injure his neighbour, and the 
 
 25. Id. at 61, 66.  26. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085. 
 27. Id. at 1086–87. 
 28. Id. at 1085. 
 29. Id. at 1086. 
 30. Id. at 1107. 
 31. Id. at 1107–08. 
 32. Id. at 1108. 
 33. Id. at 1107. 
 34. Id. at 1110. 
 35. Id. at 1104. 
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neighbour has in law a right not to be so injured and an additional right 
to compensation where injury occurs.”36  On the other hand, 
   . . . In an action based on a breach of contract, the only link between the parties for the purpose of defining their rights and obligations is the contract.  Where the defendant has breached the contract, the remedies open to the plaintiff must arise from that contractual relationship, that ‘private law’, which the parties agreed to accept.37 
However, Justice McIntyre opined that the distinction between the 
nature of tortious liability and liability for breach of contract did not 
provide a reason to refuse extending punitive damages into the latter 
context.  Rather, it served as a basis for surmising that an award of 
punitive damages would be “very rare in contract cases.”38  Beyond the 
suggestion that the difference between the two forms of liability did not 
preclude the punitive damages awards in the contractual context, the 
Court offered no reasoned explanation for the proposition that punitive 
damages should be extended into the purely contractual arena.  
Presumably, the Court felt that it was necessary or desirable to do so in 
order to provide a disincentive for conduct that, although “harsh, 
vindictive, reprehensible and malicious,”39 is not tortious in nature. 
Second, Justice McIntyre’s reason for declining to award punitive 
damages on the facts of Vorvis, though clearly expressed and quite 
defensible, has created a trail of confusion in subsequent cases.  Justice 
McIntyre was of the view that the heavy-handed supervision exercised 
by the plaintiff’s supervisor was not “sufficiently offensive, standing 
alone, to constitute actionable wrong . . . .”40  Justice McIntyre indicated 
that the only basis for the imposition of punishment “must be a finding 
of the commission of an actionable wrong which caused the injury 
complained of by the plaintiff.”41  Such an approach, as Justice McIntyre 
noted, was consistent with the American rule that awarded punitive 
damages in a contract case only when the breach of contract also 
constituted a tort for which punitive damages would be recoverable.42  
The supervisor’s heavy-handed supervision appeared to be neither 
tortious nor a breach of any term of the employment contract.  More 
 
 36. Id. at 1107. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1107–08. 
 40. Id. at 1110. 
 41. Id. at 1106. 
 42. Id. (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981)). 
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particularly, it appears that Justice McIntyre considered that this conduct 
did not constitute a breach of the term requiring the employer to give 
reasonable notice of termination. 
This reasoning appears unexceptionable.  Justice McIntyre was simply 
reiterating the proposition that in the absence of a breach of a duty of 
some kind, punitive damages cannot be awarded.  In subsequent cases, 
however, it has been assumed by courts, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada, that Justice McIntyre simply precluded the possibility that 
punitive damages could ever be awarded for the offensive manner in 
which a notice of dismissal is effected.  Further, later courts have 
struggled with the notion of whether an award of punitive damages is 
permissible, then, only where there exists an independent “actionable 
wrong” other than the principal breach of contract with respect to which 
damages are claimed.  The answer to this question, surely, should be that 
if the principal breach of contract in issue is sufficiently offensive in 
nature, the holding in Vorvis suggests that punitive damages would be 
available, notwithstanding the absence of any additional breach of duty, 
whether tortious or contractual.  The problem, as Justice McIntyre saw it 
in Vorvis, was that the offensive conduct allegations related to the 
manner of supervision leading up to the decision to dismiss, rather than 
to the manner in which the employer breached the reasonable notice 
requirement.  While it may be difficult to imagine circumstances where 
the manner of giving unreasonable notice is so offensive as to warrant an 
award of punitive damages, nothing in the reasoning of Justice McIntyre 
in Vorvis precludes this possibility. 
The third point of interest is the approach taken to the same issue by 
Justice Wilson who, in her dissent on this point, would have awarded 
punitive damages.  Justice Wilson disagreed with what she characterized 
as Justice McIntyre’s view that “punitive damages can only be awarded 
when the misconduct is in itself an ‘actionable wrong.’”43  Rather, in her 
view, “the correct approach is to assess the conduct in the context of all 
the circumstances and determine whether it is deserving of punishment 
because of its shockingly harsh, vindictive, reprehensible or malicious 
nature.”44  On the present facts, the employer had engaged in “reprehensible 
conduct . . . towards a sensitive, dedicated and conscientious employee.  
The appellant was harassed and humiliated and . . . ultimately dismissed 
for no cause after a sustained period of such treatment.”45  Thus, Justice 
Wilson appears to be suggesting that even in the absence of a breach of 
duty, whether tortious or contractual, punitive damages may be awarded. 
 
 43. Id. at 1130. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1130–31. 
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Another plausible interpretation of her view, however, is that the 
humiliating nature of the dismissal notice renders the breach of the 
requirement to give reasonable notice a sufficiently offensive character 
to attract an award of punitive damages.  However, one might object to 
this interpretation of Justice Wilson’s views by arguing that Justice 
Wilson did not draw a clear distinction between the conduct leading up 
to the decision to dismiss and the manner of the dismissal itself, a 
distinction which is implicit in Justice McIntyre’s reasoning, and which 
does appear to ground his decision. 
Subsequently, Canadian courts have taken the view that the Vorvis 
decision does require that in addition to finding that a principal breach of 
contract sounding in damages has occurred, one must find, in order to 
grant an award of punitive damages, that the offensive conduct constitutes a 
separate actionable wrong in the form of either tortious misconduct or an 
additional breach of contract.46  Indeed, in the particular context of 
wrongful dismissal, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed the view 
that punitive damages cannot be awarded with respect to an offensive 
manner of giving termination notice on the theory that punitive damages 
can only be awarded where there is, in addition to the failure to give 
reasonable notice, a separate actionable wrong. 
In Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd.,47 the Court affirmed this 
view, however it further held that an employer who engages in “callous 
and insensitive treatment”48 in dismissing an employee, though not liable 
for punitive damages, may attract liability in the form of an extension of 
the required reasonable notice period.49  This is so, in the Court’s view, 
even though the misconduct cannot be held to be a breach of an implied 
term to dismiss only in good faith.  Such a term, in the majority’s view, 
should not be implied into the employment contract as it would 
 
 46. See, e.g., Marshall v. Watson Wyatt & Co., [2002] 209 D.L.R. (4th) 411, 426 (Ont. C.A.); Schimp v. RCR Catering Ltd., [2004] 236 D.L.R. (4th) 461, 480–81 (N.S.C.A.).  In New Brunswick, however, this confusion has been cleared up by legislation providing that in a claim for “aggravated, exemplary or punitive damages, it is not necessary that the matter in respect of which those damages are claimed be an actionable wrong independent of the alleged wrong for which the proceedings are brought.”  Law Reform Act, R.S.N.B., Ch. L-1.2, §  .3(1) (1993) (Can.).  47. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 705. 
 48. Id. at 740.  Justice Iacobucci further characterized such conduct as “bad faith conduct in the manner of dismissal,” and offered as illustrations thereof “conduct that is unfair or is in bad faith by being, for example, untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive.”  Id. at 740, 743. 
 49. Id. at 705. 
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constitute an undesirable fetter on the employer’s capacity to dismiss 
without cause and upon reasonable notice.50  Thus, at least in the 
wrongful dismissal context, the Court appears to have taken the rather 
surprising view that even in the absence of a breach of duty, be it 
tortious or contractual, compensation can be awarded.  In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice McLachlin suggested that a clearer and sounder approach 
would be to hold that a term is to be implied in the employment contract 
that the employer must not engage in such conduct.  The breach of such 
term could thus clearly and directly lead to an award of damages, 
including potentially, punitive damages.51 
To some extent, these difficulties arise from a failure to draw a clear 
distinction between the manner in which the decision to dismiss is 
reached as opposed to the manner of the dismissal itself.  The approach 
that Justice McLachlin advocated in her dissent avoids the confusion that 
results from this deficiency by implying a term, which imposes 
obligations of good faith conduct relating to the dismissal of an 
employee.52  Calculation of the notice period, for Justice McLachlin, 
then, can be and should be restricted to an assessment of those factors, 
including the manner of dismissal, that may have an impact on the 
“difficulty of finding replacement employment.”53 
In the majority view, however, the Canadian law of wrongful dismissal 
appears now to have reached the position where punitive damages 
relating to the manner of dismissal are not available.  Nevertheless, 
curiously, an employer who behaves in a “callous and insensitive” 
manner relating to the dismissal of an employee is vulnerable to an 
extension of the period of reasonable notice period, even though the 
conduct in question may not, in itself, constitute a breach of either 
tortious or contractual duties.  Damages awarded on this basis appear to 
constitute punitive damages for wrongful dismissal by another name.54 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 748–49, 757, 762–64. 
 52. See id. at 762 (placing reliance on academic commentary supporting the recognition of an implied term of this kind); see, e.g., Randall B. Schai, Aggravated 
Damages and the Employment Contract, 55 SASK. L. REV. 345 (1991) (suggesting that the addition of an implied condition of good faith to employment contracts would align such agreements with modern realities); Geoffrey England, Recent Developments in the 
Law of the Employment Contract: Continuing Tension Between the Rights Paradigm and 
the Efficiency Paradigm, 20 QUEEN’S L.J. 557 (1995) (observing that lack of empirical research on the effect of lengthening the notice period in dismissal cases hampers judges from effectively balancing the rights of employees with the employer’s efficiency concerns). 
 53. Wallace, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 751.  54. In the wake of Wallace, several Canadian courts have awarded damages calculated on the basis of an extended notice period in order to reflect harsh treatment in the manner of dismissal.  See, e.g., Cassady v. Wyeth-Ayerst Can. Inc., [1998] 163 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 12 (B.C.C.A.); Montague v. Bank of N.S., [2004] 69 O.R. (3d) 87, 94 (Ont. C.A.). 
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Putting to one side the unsatisfactory complexities of the current 
Canadian law on wrongful dismissal, it was clearly accepted that, as a 
result of the decision in Vorvis, punitive damages had become 
potentially available in Canadian law for breach of contract.  It was only 
in the later decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.,55 however, that the 
Supreme Court of Canada actually approved an award of this kind.  In 
this case, the Court upheld an award of $1 million in punitive damages 
against a defendant insurer who had breached its implied contractual 
duty to handle claims by an insured in such fashion as to meet a standard 
of good faith and fair dealing.56  The defendant had conceded that it had 
breached this duty on the facts of this case.57 
The facts were propitious for a punitive damages claim.58  The claimant’s 
home had been destroyed by an accidental fire.  The claim under her 
insurance policy with the defendant was met with skepticism and, 
ultimately, indefensibly harsh treatment.  Indeed, over advice to the contrary 
of an independent insurance adjuster, the insurance industry’s Crime 
Prevention Bureau, the fire department, and an engineering expert and a 
firefighter, both retained by the defendant insurer, the defendant persisted in 
the view that the fire resulted from arson committed by the plaintiff and 
her husband.59  Acting on this theory, the insurer terminated interim 
payments to the claimant, being well aware that the plaintiff and her 
husband were in precarious financial circumstances, in an apparent 
attempt to coerce an unfairly low settlement amount.60  Further, the 
defendant forced the claimant to litigate her claim at an estimated cost of 
$320,000.61  At trial, the jury awarded approximately $318,252 in 
compensatory damages and an additional amount of $1 million as 
punitive damages.62  The Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the punitive 
damage award to $100,000, though one dissenting member of the panel 
would have dismissed the appeal.63 
However, on further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the 
jury award.  Characterizing the conduct of the defendant insurer as that 
 
 55. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 596. 
 56. Id. at 596–97. 
 57. Id. at 604, 608. 
 58. Id. at 596. 
 59. Id. at 605–08, 611. 
 60. Id. at 607. 
 61. Id. at 603. 
 62. Id. at 613. 
 63. Id. at 604, 614–15. 
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of having “behaved abominably”64 the Court had no difficulty in finding 
that the defendant had behaved in a “malicious, oppressive and high-
handed” manner that “offends the court’s sense of decency.”65  On this 
occasion, however, the Court engaged in an extended analysis of the 
history and purposes of the punitive damages awards.  This led the Court 
to offer a series of conclusions concerning the general nature and role of 
the punitive damages award.  On behalf of the majority, Justice Binnie 
stated that “[p]unishment is a legitimate objective not only of the 
criminal law but of the civil law,”66 and that punitive damages “serve a 
need that is not met either by the pure civil law or the pure criminal 
law.”67  Thus, in the present case, only the claimant could be rationally 
expected to invest $320,000 of costs in the attempt to prove that the 
defendant had acted in bad faith.  An award that undoubtedly 
overcompensates the plaintiff is given “in exchange for this socially 
useful service.”68 
After a lengthy survey of developments in England, Australia, New 
Zealand, Ireland, and the United States, Justice Binnie concluded that 
the English attempt to limit punitive damages by “categories” did not 
work and had been rightly rejected by Canadian courts.69  Further, he 
indicated that there exists a “substantial consensus” that the general 
objectives that punitive damages serve are retribution, deterrence of the 
wrongdoer and others, and denunciation.70  Additionally, while conceding 
that the primary punishment vehicle is the criminal law and that successful 
prosecution had in some jurisdictions been held to preclude punitive 
damages, Justice Binnie thought that prior punishment for the defendant’s 
misconduct in issue should be considered merely another factor in 
making a punitive damages award, “albeit a factor of potentially great 
importance.”71  Further, Justice Binnie expressed the view that the 
incantation of “time-honoured pejoratives, (‘high-handed’, ‘oppressive’, 
‘vindictive’, etc.) provide[d] insufficient guidance . . . .”72  In formulating 
more satisfactory guidance in making such awards, emphasis was to be 
placed, in his view, on the need to promote rationality, proportionality, and 
sensitivity to the particular circumstances of the case.73  Finally, he 
suggested that it may be rational to employ a punitive damages award to 
 
 64. Id. at 617. 
 65. Id. (quoting Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1208). 
 66. Id. at 617. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 634. 
 70. Id. at 635. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 636. 
 73. Id. at 636–37. 
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relieve a wrongdoer of its profit.74  As we shall see, Justice Binnie 
returned to a number of these themes in attempting to fashion a set of 
control mechanisms that are intended to preclude the making of 
excessive punitive damages awards. 
While the majority’s analysis admirably set the stage for the attempt to 
craft limitations on the punitive damages awards, less analytical rigor 
was applied to the question whether such awards ought to be extended 
beyond tort to the pure contractual breach context.  The majority essentially 
adopted the view that the Court had previously settled the matter in the 
Vorvis case.75  Unfortunately, however, the Court perpetuated the notion 
that had plagued reasoning in the lower courts after Vorvis that such 
awards could be made only if the offensive conduct constituted a 
separate “actionable wrong.”76  The Court backed into this difficulty by asking whether breach of contract, rather than tort, could constitute such 
a separate actionable wrong.77 
In answering this question, the majority placed emphasis on the fact 
that Justice McIntyre chose to use the expression “actionable wrong”78 
rather than the term “tort,” which is employed in the Restatement of 
Contracts.79  It further noted that the possibility of punitive damages for 
breach of contract appeared to have been conceded by the Court in a 
subsequent case.80  Moreover, the majority suggested that “the requirement 
of an independent tort would unnecessarily complicate the pleadings, 
without in most cases adding anything of substance.”81  The majority’s 
survey of comparative experience did not observe that in the jurisdictions in 
question, including the United States, punitive damages are not typically 
awarded in pure breach of contract claims.  The recent English Law 
Commission recommendation that exemplary or punitive damages ought 
not be awarded in the context of contractual breach82 was not referred to, 
nor was any response offered to the Commission’s arguments in support 
of that recommendation. 
Although the Court in Pilot Insurance rejected the restriction observed 
 
 74. Id. at 636. 
 75. Id. at 637. 
 76. Id. at 638–39. 
 77. Id. at 637, 639. 
 78. Id. at 639.  79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
 80. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 639. 
 81. Id.  82. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 7, at 185. 
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elsewhere of limiting punitive damages to tortious wrongdoing, the 
Court, as we have noted, retained and applied the independent actionable 
wrong requirement said to derive from the previous decision of the 
Court in Vorvis.83  Thus, in order to grant a punitive damages award on 
the facts of Pilot Insurance, it would be necessary to find that, in 
addition to the breach of contract constituted by the failure to pay the 
claim, a further independent actionable wrong, whether a tort or a breach 
of contract, also occurred.  In the Court’s view, this requirement was met 
on the facts of Pilot Insurance because the defendant’s abominable 
behavior constituted a breach of the insurer’s implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, which requires the insurer to process claims in a prompt 
and fair manner.84 
As indicated above, the independent “actionable wrong” requirement 
appears to stem from a misreading of Justice McIntyre’s reasons in the 
Vorvis case.  Moreover, no explanation was given for the proposition 
that although one single breach of duty suffices for punitive damages in 
a tort context, punitive damages in contract require two breaches of duty.  
Indeed, it appears that no coherent justification can be offered for the 
latter requirement.  It thus appears likely that, in due course and in an 
appropriate case, Canadian appellate courts, including the Supreme 
Court of Canada, will come to the conclusion that the circumstances of a 
single breach of contract could be such as to give rise to an appropriate 
punitive damages award. 
Notwithstanding this inelegant source of continuing analytical difficulty, 
the decision in Pilot Insurance plainly establishes a jurisdiction to award 
punitive damages in a breach of contract case.  The case is also noteworthy, 
however, for the Court’s attempt to craft a series of control mechanisms 
that will limit such awards, a topic to which we now turn. 
III.  CONTROL MECHANISMS 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Pilot Insurance is the Court’s attempt to set out an extensive set of 
guidelines for both trial judges and appellate courts in order to reign in 
and control the potential for excessive punitive damage awards.  The 
Court essentially identified three different types of guidelines.  First, the 
Court sought to structure the trial judge’s charge to the jury in a fashion 
that would caution, if not ensure, restraint in the making of such 
awards.85  Second, the Court indicated that the level of scrutiny that 
 
 83. Pilot Ins. Co., at 637–39. 
 84. Id. at 596–97. 
 85. Id. at 644–47. 
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appellate courts exercise in reviewing such awards was to be at a higher 
level than that normally exercised in supervising damage awards.86  
Third, the Court crafted an extensive set of guidelines setting a standard 
of “rationality” that punitive damage awards must meet.87 
Structuring the Jury Charge.  The jury charge that the trial judge gave 
in Pilot Insurance was rather sparse.  Accordingly, the respondent had 
argued that the trial judge had not offered adequate guidance to the 
jury.88  While the Court conceded that the trial judge’s charge was, 
indeed, “skeletal,”89 it agreed, albeit with “some hesitation,”90 with the 
unanimous view of the Court of Appeal below, that the jury charge had 
covered the essentials, however lightly.  As a general matter, however, 
Justice Binnie suggested that the jury charge should not leave the jurors 
“to guess what their role and function is.”91  To that end, in his view, it would be helpful if the jury charge placed emphasis on a number of 
points. 
First, the exceptional nature of punitive damages should be stressed, 
placing emphasis on the usual string of pejoratives identifying conduct 
that “departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent 
behaviour.”92  Further, the jury should be advised that damages are to be 
assessed in an amount “reasonably proportionate to such factors as the 
harm caused, the degree of the misconduct, the relative vulnerability of 
the plaintiff and any advantage or profit gained by the defendant.”93  
Additionally, the jury should be instructed that the purpose of punitive 
damages is not to compensate, but rather to give the defendant his or her 
just dessert, to deter the defendant and others from similar misconduct in 
the future, and to mark the community’s collective condemnation of 
what has happened.94  Thus, punitive damages are to be awarded only 
where compensatory damages are inadequate, and only in an amount 
that is necessary to rationally accomplish these purposes.  The jury also 
should be plainly told that the plaintiff will keep the punitive damages as 
 
 86. Id. at 649–50. 
 87. Id. at 647–49. 
 88. Id. at 644. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 647. 
 91. Id. at 644. 
 92. Id. at 645. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
MCCAMUS.DOC 8/21/2019  11:56 AM 
 
1506 
a “windfall”95 in addition to compensatory damages, and that judges and 
juries in our system of law have usually found that “moderate awards . . . 
are generally sufficient.”96  Further, the jury should be advised to have 
regard to other fines or penalties suffered by the defendant, and to award 
punitive damages only where the misconduct would be otherwise 
unpunished or inadequately punished.  Although Justice Binnie concluded 
by indicating that the use of any particular expression was not obligatory, it 
was nonetheless incumbent on the trial judge to “emphasize the nature, 
scope and exceptional nature of the remedy, and fairness to both sides.”97 
Standard for Appellate Scrutiny.  In exercising supervision over 
punitive damages awards, the role of appellate courts was envisaged by 
the Pilot Insurance majority to be a more muscular one than is exercised 
with respect to general damage awards.  With respect to the latter, courts 
may only intervene if the award is “so exorbitant or so grossly out of 
proportion [to the injury] as to shock the court’s conscience and sense of 
justice.”98  In the context of punitive damages, however, Justice Binnie 
indicated that the emphasis must be on the appellate Court’s obligation 
to ensure that the award is the product of reason and rationality.  In his 
view, “[t]he focus is on whether the court’s sense of reason is offended 
rather than on whether its conscience is shocked.”99  As we shall see, 
Justice Binnie spelled out in great detail the applicable standard of 
review—rationality—in an attempt to set a standard that would 
effectively confine the discretion exercised by judge or jury at trial.  
What is envisaged, however, is a discretion to award punitive damages 
within a range bounded by rationality at either end of the range.  The 
Canadian Supreme Court did not opt, then, for the type of de novo 
appellate review adopted in the modern U.S. authorities.100  We will 
return to this point. 
Confining the Discretion to Award Punitive Damages.  The standard 
of rationality to be applied in appellate scrutiny of punitive damage 
awards is obviously a device designed to structure and confine the 
discretion of judge and jury to award punitive damages at trial.  This test 
applies both to the threshold question of whether to award punitive 
damages at all and to the issue of quantum.  With respect to the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 646. 
 98. Id. at 649 (quoting Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1194). 
 99. Id. at 650.  100. Cooper Indust., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001); see also Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury 
Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 411 (2002) (evaluating the appropriate role of the jury in awarding punitive damages). 
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threshold question, it must be considered whether the award of punitive 
damages constituted a “rational response” to the defendant’s misconduct.  
One must assess whether such an award was rationally required to meet the 
objectives served by punitive damages.  On the facts of Pilot Insurance, 
the Court had little difficulty reaching an affirmative conclusion on this 
point.  The award had apparently answered the jury’s perceived need for 
“retribution, denunciation and deterrence.”101  The Court agreed that this 
was “an exceptional case that justified an exceptional remedy.”102 
Turning to the question of quantum, however, the Court developed a 
much more elaborate set of guidelines to determine “whether a reasonable 
jury, properly instructed, could have concluded that an award in that 
amount, and no less, was rationally required to punish the defendant’s 
misconduct.”103  In determining the critical issue of rationality, the key to 
applying that standard rests on a concept of “proportionality.”  “A 
disproportionate award overshoots its purpose and becomes irrational.”104  
In the Court’s view, there are six aspects to the proportionality criterion.  First, 
the award must be proportionate to the “blameworthiness” of the 
defendant’s conduct in the light of such considerations as whether the 
misconduct was planned and deliberate, the nature of the defendant’s 
motive, its persistence in the conduct, any attempted cover-up or 
concealment, awareness of the wrongful nature of the conduct, whether 
the defendant profited from the misconduct, and whether the interest 
violated by the misconduct was deeply personal to the plaintiff, as, for 
example, in the case of injury to the plaintiff’s professional reputation.105 
Second, the award must be proportionate to the degree of the 
plaintiff’s vulnerability.106  Thus, the fact that the defendant has taken 
advantage of a significant power imbalance between the parties will be a 
relevant consideration.  For this reason, the Court observed that this 
factor militates against the award of punitive damages in most commercial 
situations.107  Indeed, in the Court’s contemporaneously released decision in 
Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd.,108 the 
Court struck down a punitive damages award of $200,000 in the context of 
 
 101. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 648. 
 102. Id. at 649. 
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 650. 
 105. Id. at 651. 
 106. Id. at 652–53. 
 107. Id. at 653.  108. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 678, 679. 
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a dispute concerning a proposed real estate development.  Although the 
defendant’s conduct had been fraudulent and reprehensible, the Court 
emphasized that this was a commercial relationship between two 
businessmen and, further, that the facts did not reveal an “abuse of a 
dominant position.”109  In the particular circumstances, then, neither the 
award of punitive damages itself nor the particular quantum met the test of 
rationality.110 
Third, the award must be proportionate to the actual or potential harm 
directed specifically at the plaintiff.111  A punitive damages award would 
not be appropriate where the plaintiff was merely a peripheral or minor 
victim of the defendant’s wrongdoing.  Fourth, the award must be 
proportionate to the need for deterrence.112  In fashioning a rational response 
to the need for deterrence, it would be appropriate to determine whether the 
misconduct in question is typical of the defendant’s conduct in a more 
general way.  It may also be relevant to consider the “financial power”113 of 
the defendant in circumstances where a more substantial award is required, 
as a result, to achieve effective deterrence.  Thus, the punishment “should 
‘sting.’”114  Justice Binnie cautioned, however, that this factor is of limited importance, and that, as a matter of general practice, the defendant’s 
financial worth ought not be mentioned to a jury prior to the liability 
determination.115 
Fifth, the award must be proportionate in the light of other penalties, both 
civil and criminal, to which the defendant has been or will likely be 
subject.116  Finally, the award should be proportionate to the advantage 
gained or profits made through the misconduct.117  With respect to this latter 
point, the Court made no mention that in the context of tortious and other 
forms of wrongdoing, an accounting of profits and other similar remedies 
would more directly achieve a profit-stripping function.118 
In setting out as the standard for appellate review the test that a 
reasonable jury, properly instructed, could have concluded that an award 
in the amount in question “and no less” was rationally required,119 it may 
 
 109. Id. at 712. 
 110. Id. at 714. 
 111. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 653–54. 
 112. Id. at 654–55. 
 113. Id. at 654. 
 114. Id. at 655. 
 115. Id. at 654–55. 
 116. Id. at 655. 
 117. Id. at 656.  118. For discussion of this point, see PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 748–52 (2d ed. 2004). 
 119. See Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 649 (“[T]he test is whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could have concluded that an award in that amount, and no 
less, was rationally required to punish the defendant’s misconduct.”). 
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appear that something approximating de novo review is envisaged by the 
Court.  This, however, does not appear to be the case.  In applying the 
test to the actual award in Pilot Insurance, Justice Binnie indicated that 
although he would not himself have awarded $1 million in punitive 
damages on these facts, the award was, nonetheless, “within the rational 
limits within which a jury must be allowed to operate.”120  The jury had 
been adequately instructed that it should make an award of punitive 
damages “if, but only if”121 the award of compensatory damages was 
insufficient.  “The award was not so disproportionate as to exceed the 
bounds of rationality.”122  In response to the defendant’s objection that 
prior to this judgment, the highest previous punitive damages award in 
an insured bad faith case was $50,000, the Court observed that “[o]ne of 
the strengths of the jury system is that it keeps the law in touch with 
evolving realities, including financial realities.”123 
IV.  THE AFTERMATH 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Pilot Insurance 
case is obviously a remarkable one for a number of reasons.  Although 
the Court recognized the potential availability of punitive damages in the 
contractual context several years earlier in the Vorvis case, Pilot 
Insurance is the first decision in which it approved a punitive damages 
award that, at least to a Canadian observer, looks more American in its 
quantum than its predecessors.  In the absence of empirical study of the 
decision’s practical effects, one may nonetheless confidently predict that 
the decision has provoked greater frequency in the pleading of claims for 
substantial punitive damages awards.  At the same time, however, the 
practical impact of the court-fashioned control mechanisms to limit such 
awards can only be the subject of speculation. 
Nonetheless, there is at least some evidence in recent appellate 
decisions that Canadian courts will indeed exercise the supervisory 
jurisdiction committed to them by the Pilot Insurance decision.  Two 
recent decisions by the Ontario Court of Appeal are of interest.  In 
Ferme Gérald Laplante & Fils Ltée v. Grenville Patron Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co.,124 the court reversed a jury award of punitive damages in 
 
 120. Id. at 658. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 661–62.  124. [2002] 217 D.L.R. (4th) 34 (Ont. C.A.). 
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another insurer bad faith case.  Following upon a fire at the plaintiff’s 
farm, a hard fought dispute took place between the plaintiff farmer and 
the defendant insurer.  By the time of trial, although the insurer had already 
paid out to the plaintiff $1.17 million, a number of disputed items remained.  
The jury awarded an additional $488,389 in compensatory damages and 
$750,000 in punitive damages.125  The Court of Appeal held that although 
the jury could have found that a breach of the good faith duty had 
occurred, the jury could not rationally have concluded that an award of 
punitive damages was required to punish the defendant’s misconduct.126 
Similarly, in a wrongful dismissal case, Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for 
Geriatric Care, the court set aside a $5,000 award for punitive damages.127  Even though the employer’s treatment of the plaintiff at the time of 
dismissal had amounted to the tort of intentional infliction of mental 
suffering, an award of damages for mental distress had effectively 
compensated for the wrong.  Accordingly, in the court’s view, an award 
of punitive damages was not necessary for deterrence purposes and 
served no rational purpose.128  Although the same court upheld a substantial 
punitive damages award in another case,129 at least for the moment, such 
decisions offer some comfort to those observers who worry that Pilot 
Insurance has indeed introduced an Americanization of the punitive 
damages awards in common law Canada. 
V.  THE PERCEIVED NEED OR ROLE 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada offers an extensive and 
scholarly analysis of the history, comparative experience, and the means 
of structuring punitive damages awards, there is one glaring omission in 
its opinion.  Mainly, this omission stems from the absence of a careful 
assessment of whether there is a need or a clear role for the punitive 
damages concept in the context of pure or mere breaches of contract.  
The early experience strongly suggests that the claims for punitive 
damages of this kind will arise principally in the context of bad faith 
insurance claims, and claims for wrongful dismissal in circumstances 
where the employer has coupled dismissal with an imputation, other bad 
faith, or abusive conduct.  Consequently, in assessing the contribution 
made by Pilot Insurance,130 it may be useful to consider briefly the prior 
 
 125. Id. at 36–37. 
 126. Id. at 35.  127. [2002] 60 O.R. (3d) 474, 475 (C.A.). 
 128. Id. at 475–76. 
 129. See Khazzaka v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Can., [2002] 66 O.R. (3d) 390 (C.A.) (representing a case with facts similar to Pilot Insurance Co. and decision upholding jury award of $200,000 in punitive damages).  130. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595. 
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Canadian law concerning punitive damages as it might apply in these 
two contexts.  Further, as punitive damages claims often arise in the 
context of abusive treatment that may potentially cause psychological 
stress or injury, it will also be useful to briefly consider the availability 
of compensation for such injuries in these contexts. 
With respect to punitive damages, it is well-established Canadian law 
that punitive damages are not narrowly restricted to the two categories of 
tort claims that the House of Lords identified in Rookes v. Barnard.131  
Punitive damages are generally available in the context of tort claims 
and, more particularly, in the context of negligence claims, provided that 
the negligence exhibits a degree of callousness that warrants a punitive 
damages award.  In the leading case of Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey 
Club Ltd.,132 the plaintiff was a professional hockey player who suffered 
a serious spinal injury that was misdiagnosed by the defending team’s 
physician.  After an initial injury, the team’s management ignored 
Robitaille’s request for medical treatment, considered his continuing 
complaints concerning symptoms unfounded, and pressured the plaintiff 
to continue playing by threats of suspension.  In a subsequent game, 
Robitaille was further injured and suffered a permanent and disabling 
spinal cord injury.133  The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a 
punitive damages award at trial on the basis that the defendant’s 
negligence was “such as to merit condemnation.”134  Although the test 
for the availability of punitive damages in a tort context has been 
variously stated, the Supreme Court emphasized in Norberg v. Wynrib135 
that it was not necessary to meet the threshold of “harsh, vindictive or 
malicious” conduct suggested in Vorvis,136 but it was sufficient to 
establish that the conduct was “reprehensible and it was of a type to 
offend the ordinary standards of decent conduct in the community.”137 
Turning to damages for mental distress resulting from contractual 
breach, the position under traditional Canadian and English common law 
doctrine was that such damages were not available.  In the latter part of 
 
 131. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.).  132. [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.C.A.); see also A. v. Bottril, [2003] 1 A.C. 449 (P.C.) (providing that inadvertent negligence can give rise to punitive damages where the conduct is so outrageous as to warrant condemnation and punishment). 
 133. Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 229–32. 
 134. Id. at 251.  135. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226. 
 136. Id. at 268. 
 137. Id. 
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the twentieth century, however, English and then Canadian courts 
recognized claims of this kind.  The leading English case, Jarvis v. 
Swans Tours Ltd.,138 is a classroom favorite in which a solicitor’s high 
hopes for a pleasurable two-week Swiss vacation—fueled by claims 
made in the defendant’s brochure—were dashed when virtually all of the 
advertised virtues of the experience proved to be either nonexistent or 
below par.  The Court of Appeal awarded damages for the resulting mental 
aggravation.139  The nature of this case and subsequent authorities provided 
a basis for the conclusion that at least in English law, such claims were 
restricted to contractual contexts in which the object of the agreement 
was to provide a pleasurable experience, or, at least, to ensure one’s 
peace of mind.140 
The House of Lords recently clarified the English doctrine on this 
point in Farley v. Skinner.141  The plaintiff, a prospective purchaser of a 
country property, retained the defendant surveyor to inspect the property 
and, inter alia, asked him to investigate whether the property would be 
seriously affected by aircraft noise given its proximity to Gatwick 
International Airport.  Reassured on the latter point by the defendant, the 
plaintiff acquired the property and, upon moving in, discovered that the 
defendant’s advice on this point was seriously in error.  The purchaser 
brought a claim for non-pecuniary damages for the loss of tranquility 
resulting from the substantial presence of aircraft noise on the property.  
The defendant argued in response that such damages could only be 
claimed where the very object of the contract is to provide pleasure, 
relaxation, or peace of mind, and that a contract with a surveyor to 
inspect a property did not come within that category of agreements.142  
The House of Lords allowed the claim, however, on the basis that it was 
sufficient if “a major or important object of the contract is to give 
pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind.”143  Thus, in this case, where the 
contract to inspect included a particular undertaking concerning airplane 
 
 138. [1973] Q.B. 233 (C.A. 1972). 
 139. Id.  140. Thus, claims have been allowed against solicitors whose failure to provide service at a reasonable level of skill and care forseeably caused mental distress to the client.  See, e.g., Heywood v. Wellers, [1976] Q.B. 446, 447 (C.A. 1975) (representing mishandled attempt on behalf of female client to restrain a man from molesting her); Hamilton Jones v. David & Snape (a firm), [2004] 1 All E.R. 657, 658 (Ch. 2003) (illustrating negligent failure to prevent removal of client’s children from jurisdiction); 
see also P.A. Wournell Contracting Ltd. v. Allen, [1979] 100 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (N.S.T.D.) (involving solicitor’s failure to incorporate company), rev’d on other grounds, [1980] 108 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (N.S.C.A.); Boudreau v. Benaiah, [2000] 182 D.L.R. (4th) 569 (Ont. C.A.) (conducting negligent defense of criminal charges).  141. [2001] 4 All E.R. 801 (H.L.). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 812. 
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noise that had such an object, damages for consequential mental distress 
were available. 
In Canada, however, it is unlikely that even this limitation exists on 
the availability of damages for mental distress.  Canadian courts have 
applied the Jarvis doctrine in cases in which the agreements breached 
cannot be characterized as providing for pleasure or peace of mind.144  
They have also accepted that the Jarvis doctrine may apply in the 
context of wrongful dismissal cases,145 though in Vorvis,146 the majority 
of the court emphasized that, as with punitive damages, it was necessary 
to find that the mental injury resulted from an independently actionable 
wrong.  In this context, the purport of the opinion is simply to suggest 
that where the mental injury results from the employer behavior 
preceding the wrongful dismissal, it is necessary to show that the 
employer’s behavior is itself actionable. 
In dissent, Justice Wilson stated perhaps more accurately the governing 
Canadian principle to the effect that “aggravated damages for mental 
suffering may be awarded in breach of contract cases . . . [where] the 
parties should reasonably have foreseen mental suffering as a consequence 
of a breach of the contract at the time the contract was entered into.”147  
On this view, presumably, the English requirement that the contract 
contain at least one aspect designed to provide pleasure or peace of mind 
is considered to be simply a proxy for the reasonable foreseeability test.  
Accordingly, there is no compelling reason not to simply apply the test 
itself.  In Vorvis, Justice Wilson appears to have accepted that the 
manner of wrongfully dismissing an employee might give rise to a claim 
of this kind.148 
 
 144. See, e.g., Zuker v. Paul, [1982] 135 D.L.R. (3d) 481, 481–82 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (representing breach of warranty of title to automobile); Taylor v. Gill, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 727 (Alta Q.B.) (involving noncompletion of sale of residential premises); Gourlay v. Osmond, [1991] 104 N.S.R.2d 155 (Trial Div.) (involving noncompletion of purchase of residential premises); Kempling v. Hearthstone Manor Corp., [1996] 137 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. C.A.) (involving noncompletion of sale of condominium unit). 
 145. See, e.g., Brown v. Waterloo Reg’l Bd, of Comm’rs of Police, [1983] 150 D.L.R. (3d) 729 (Ont. C.A.) (stating that damages for mental distress could be awarded where reasonably foreseeable consequence of dismissal); see also Kopij v. Metro. Toronto (Municipality), [1996] 29 O.R. (3d) 752 (General Div.) (holding damages available for mental distress where violation of procedural fairness in dismissal is negligent and where distress is reasonably foreseeable).  146. Vorvis v. Ins Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085. 
 147. Id. at 1113–14. 
 148. Id. at 1118. 
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Applying these principles, first, to the context of bad faith insurance 
claims, it is not at all obvious that the recognition of punitive damages 
for pure breach of contract was necessary in order to bring about the 
result achieved in Pilot Insurance.  Indeed, it is not obvious that the 
doctrine pronounced in Pilot Insurance was correctly applied to the facts 
of that case.  Under prior Canadian law, it is clear the defendant insurer 
would be vulnerable to a claim for punitive damages if its conduct had 
been tortious.  Although no finding on this point was made by the Court, 
there can be little doubt that Pilot Insurance had committed a tort.  
Even if one accepts the position taken by its representatives that 
they genuinely believed that Mrs. Whiten had committed arson,149 their 
conduct appeared negligent.  Further, the conduct would appear to meet 
the threshold set out in Robitaille,150 requiring manifestation of a callous 
disregard for the plaintiff’s interests.151 
If this is correct, it then follows that the entire discussion of the 
punitive damages awards for pure breach of contract is simply 
unnecessary to the decision in the Pilot Insurance case.  More generally, 
there is very little basis for thinking that punitive damages should have a 
role to play in circumstances where an insurer is guilty of lesser forms of 
wrongdoing.  If the insurer had merely engaged in negligent conduct 
which did not manifest a callous disregard for the interests of the 
insured, even the Pilot Insurance Court would not likely have awarded 
punitive damages.  Further, it is all the more unlikely that such an 
award would be made in a case where the insurer’s conduct fell short 
of negligence but nonetheless exposed the insurer to liability for mere 
breach of the implied covenant to process claim in good faith.  
Therefore, apart from cases already covered by the Robitaille principle, 
the role for punitive damages for pure breach of contract in bad faith 
insurance cases, as a practical matter, appears to be very limited, if not 
nonexistent. 
When one considers the application of the aggravated or mental 
distress damages line of authority to the Pilot Insurance fact situation, it 
seems doubtful that the Pilot Insurance principle itself was properly 
applied to the facts of that case.  Prior to Pilot Insurance, Canadian law 
has clearly established that damages for mental distress may be awarded 
in a case where the mental distress results from bad faith conduct of an 
insurer in the course of processing a plaintiff’s claim.152  Curiously, in 
 
 149. Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 612.  150. Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.C.A.). 
 151. Id. at 248. 
 152. See, e.g., Warrington v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., [1996] 139 D.L.R. (4th) 18 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that where there is a persistent refusal to pay disability 
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Pilot Insurance, no claim for aggravated damages to compensate Mrs. 
Whiten for her undoubted mental distress was advanced.  It is unclear 
why this was the case.  Even an unusually resilient personality would 
have suffered a great deal of distress as a result of the abysmal treatment 
that the defendant insurer afforded to the Whitens.  Their distress was 
surely many times more severe than the level of anxiety suffered by 
solicitor Jarvis as a result of his disappointing Swiss vacation,153 and a 
substantial award on this basis would appear warranted.  Thus, it is not 
actually correct to suggest, as the Supreme Court suggested in Pilot 
Insurance, that the Pilot Insurance jury applied its collective mind to the 
question of whether punitive damages should be awarded “if but only 
if,” compensatory damages were insufficient to meet the needs of the 
situation.154  The whole range of compensatory damages was simply not considered by the jury. 
Thus, the Pilot Insurance principle itself appears to have been 
misapplied.  It is possible, of course, that the Pilot Insurance jury might 
have awarded punitive damages on top of a substantial award for mental 
distress.  It is of interest, however, that in Prinzo,155 noted above, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal overturned an award for punitive damages at 
trial on the basis that the misconduct in question had resulted in an 
award of damages for the plaintiff’s resulting mental distress and, 
accordingly, a further award of punitive damages “[was] not necessary 
for deterrence purposes . . . [and therefore] serve[d] no rational purpose.”156  
It might well be, then, that the Pilot Insurance jury, if properly 
instructed, might have made a substantial award for damages for mental 
distress and come to a similar conclusion.  Therefore, the practical 
application of the Pilot Insurance doctrine of punitive damages for pure 
breach of contract may be severely limited. 
 
benefits, damages will be awarded for reasonably foreseeable mental distress); McIsaac v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., [1999] 173 D.L.R. (4th) 649 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that mental distress resulting from refusal to pay benefits under disability insurance compensable as such a contract is to provide “peace of mind”); Eddie v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 738 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that insurer made no reasonable effort to assess medical condition before refusing disability benefits and awarding damages for mental distress); Clarfield v. Crown Life Ins. Co., [2000] 50 O.R. (3d) 696 (Sup. C.J.) (holding that delay in handling and rejection of disability claim relating to mental illness rendered damages for resulting anxiety recoverable).  153. Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 233 (C.A. 1972). 
 154. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 658.  155. Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, [2002] 60 O.R. (3d) 474 (C.A.). 
 156. Id. at 498. 
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The Pilot Insurance court also offers little guidance as to what role 
punitive damages should play in the bad faith insurance context at an 
institutional level.  Is the punitive damages award meant to be a device 
to fill the gaps in the enforcement activities of the insurance regulators?  
Are punitive damages to be awarded in larger measure or more 
frequently in contexts in which the wrongdoing of the insurer appears to 
be of a systemic nature?  In such cases, should a plaintiff such as Mrs. 
Whiten recover all of the appropriate fine, or should the bringing of a 
representative claim be a precondition for recovery of the entire amount 
in provinces that have modern class actions legislation? 
The Pilot Insurance Court barely hints at answers to important 
questions of this sort.  The Pilot Insurance Court did not openly address 
systemic issues.  It appeared to accept the finding at trial that “there is no 
evidence this case represents a deliberate corporate strategy as opposed 
to an isolated, mishandled file that ran amok.”157  On the other hand, the 
Court went on to observe that “Pilot declined to call evidence to explain 
why this file ran amok, and what steps, if any, have been taken to 
prevent a recurrence.”158  We are left to assume that such evidence might 
have resulted in a reduction of the punitive damages award.  Further, the 
Court’s response to the submissions of the intervening industry 
representative, the Insurance Council of Canada, hints at judicial 
skepticism concerning industry practice and the regulation thereof.  The 
Council submitted that the disciplining of the insurance industry should 
be left to the provincial regulators.159  Justice Binnie replied that nothing 
in the appeal record indicated that the regulator “took an interest in this 
case prior to the jury’s unexpectedly high award of punitive damages.”160  
Further, the Court observed that, to the extent that a defendant had 
otherwise suffered punishment, either civil or criminal, for the misconduct 
in question, “the need for additional punishment in the case before the 
court [was] lessened and [might] be eliminated.”161  Although such remarks 
are perhaps suggestive of the Court’s interest in broader systemic issues, 
the role of punitive damages in attacking systemic problems in the 
insurance industry, for example, is not explicitly identified as a function 
of the doctrine nor are the implications of deploying the doctrine in this 
fashion addressed by the Court. 
When one considers the application of prior punitive damages law and 
the law of compensation for mental distress in the context of wrongful 
dismissal, Canadian law is, as we have seen, in something of a state of 
 
 157. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 659–60. 
 158. Id. at 660. 
 159. Id. at 656. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 655. 
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disarray.  With respect to punitive damages, subsequent interpretations 
of the Vorvis decision, confirmed by Justice Binnie in Pilot Insurance,162 
have adopted the curious position that punitive damages may be awarded 
for breach of contract only where a second breach of contract or tort has 
occurred, in addition to the principal breach of contract with respect to 
which the claim has been advanced.163 
As far as claims for mental distress damages resulting from wrongful 
dismissal are concerned, subsequent interpretations of the Vorvis 
decision have created a similar point of difficulty.  Canadian courts have 
generally accepted that damages for mental distress cannot be awarded 
unless there exists an independent and actionable second wrong.164  
Without doubt, the real reason why Justice McIntyre in Vorvis required a 
separate actionable wrong,165 as he attempted to explain, was that the 
failure to give reasonable notice constituting the breach was not itself 
likely to either cause mental distress or be sufficiently heinous to 
provide a basis for the punitive damages award.  The allegedly wrongful 
act in Vorvis was not the giving of insufficient notice but, rather, the 
careful supervision or, from the employee’s perspective, the harassment 
that preceded his dismissal.  Justice McIntyre’s point, then, was that the 
conduct complained of must itself constitute a breach of a contractual or 
tortious duty.  If the law of wrongful dismissal has arrived at an 
unsatisfactory state in Canadian law, however, we may note that nothing 
in the Pilot Insurance decision appears to resolve the difficulty.  It 
unhelpfully preserves the independent actionable wrong requirement for 
punitive damages.  It offers no guidance with respect to damages for 
mental distress. 
If the apparent inability of Canadian courts to award the damages for 
mental distress, relating to the manner in which the decision to dismiss is 
 
 162. Id. at 637–41.  163. The Supreme Court itself confirmed this point in McKinley v. BC Tel., [2001] 200 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 416–17 (Can.); see also Beaird v. Westinghouse Can. Inc., [1999] 43 O.R. (3d) 581, 591–92 (C.A.); Noseworthy v. Riverside Pontiac-Buick Ltd., [1998] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 629 (Ont. C.A.); Marshall v. Watson Wyatt & Co., [2002] 57 O.R. (3d) 813, 828 (C.A.); cf. Francis v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1994] 21 O.R. (3d) 75 (C.A.). 
 164. See Wurster v. Universal Envtl. Servs. Inc., [1998] 167 D.L.R. (4th) 166 (Ont. C.A.) (holding that alleged mistreatment prior to the decision to dismiss is not an independent actionable wrong); Noseworthy, [1998] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 629 (holding that dismissal accompanied by unfounded accusations of misconduct is not an independent actionable wrong).  165. Vorvis v. Ins. Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1106. 
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communicated, is considered problematic, the most coherent solution to 
the problem would be, as Justice McLachlin suggested in her dissenting 
opinion in Wallace, to imply a term not to engage in bad faith conduct in 
the course of dismissing an employee.166  Presumably, on the reasoning 
in Pilot Insurance, the breach of such a term could give rise to a claim 
for punitive damages.  Certainly, it could give rise to a claim for damages 
for mental distress.  As we have seen, however, the majority in Wallace 
rejected this approach and favored the surprising view that where a 
dismissal is conducted in a bad faith manner, the period of reasonable 
notice may be extended.  Since the misconduct, according to the majority 
view, does not constitute a breach of a contractual term, punitive damages 
are presumably unavailable.  The important point for present purposes, 
however, is that the approach adopted in Pilot Insurance with respect to 
punitive damages would appear to have no impact on, or practical 
application within, the context of wrongful dismissal cases. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Recognition of the availability of punitive damages for pure breach of 
contract by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Pilot Insurance case is, 
at best, a mixed blessing for Canadian law.  On the positive side of the 
balance, the decision crafts a set of controls to be employed by trial 
judges and appellate courts in both restricting the frequency of such 
awards and controlling their quantum.  The principal devices set out in 
the opinion are elaborate instructions to be administered by trial judges 
to juries and, no doubt, to themselves, and the assertion of a jurisdiction 
to review such awards and their quantum on appellate review on the 
basis of a rationality test.  Of these two devices, the latter is the most 
likely to enjoy success.167 
Accordingly, it is regrettable that the Court did not opt for de novo 
 
 166. Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 748–49.  167. For an account of experimental studies offering discouraging evidence of the ability and/or willingness of juries to follow even rather precise instructions on how to calculate punitive damages, see W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to 
Promote Efficiency, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 139 (2002) (advancing the thesis that the nature of the task in awarding a specific dollar amount for punitive damages is poorly designed and one that juries cannot be expected to perform well and reviewing possible reforms).  See also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on 
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998) (concluding that in personal injury cases juries often struggle with converting their moral judgments into dollar figures); David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive 
Damages Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121 (2002) (reporting that two experimental studies indicate that (1) mock jurors punish companies who have balanced risk of harm against cost of safety in manufacturing products, and (2) mock jurors are unable or unwilling to follow a set of model jury instructions designed to produce efficient damage awards). 
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review at the appellate level.  Such review would not only constitute a 
more effective controlling device, it might conduce to greater uniformity 
in the making of awards.  Further, it may be considered a somewhat 
backhanded compliment to the decision to suggest that if the analysis set 
out in this article is correct, the decision is not likely to be of much 
practical effect in increasing the frequency of punitive damage awards, 
at least in the contexts of bad faith insurance and wrongful dismissal 
cases.  One might take the view that the punitive damages in contract cat 
was let out of the bag when Canadian courts determined to allow such 
damages in the context of negligent misconduct, albeit misconduct 
which meets the requisite threshold of callousness.168  Indeed, punitive 
damages could have been awarded in Pilot Insurance on the basis of this 
principle.  Further, it has been suggested above that even after Pilot 
Insurance, it is unlikely that punitive damages will be awarded in bad 
faith insurance cases that would not be captured by the same principle.  
The net effect of Pilot Insurance may therefore be to provide clearer 
means for appellate control of the punitive damages award at trial. 
For those who see the awarding of punitive damages in civil cases as 
nothing other than an inappropriate confusion of the purposes of 
criminal and civil law, the Pilot Insurance decision’s contribution is 
irredeemably negative.  The fact that Justice Binnie, on behalf of the 
Pilot Insurance court, refers to the defendant insurer’s misconduct as 
“the offence”169 may not surprise such observers.  Those who have 
greater tolerance for punitive damage awards in contract cases may 
nonetheless find the Pilot Insurance decision disturbing.  The amount of 
the award—blessed by the Court as within the limits of rationality—is 
impressively large to Canadian observers.  Moreover, even if one 
accepts the analysis set out above concerning bad faith insurance and 
wrongful dismissal claims, it is quite possible that trial judges and juries 
will employ Pilot Insurance to expand the role of punitive damages in 
other contractual settings.  For those who, like myself, see little merit in 
extending the scope of punitive damages in the contract context beyond 
cases of breach of contract that also constitute tortious wrongdoing, the 
decision disappoints by failing to supply a convincing reason for making 
such an extension. 
 
 168. See Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.C.A.) (awarding punitive damages for negligent failure to provide adequate medical treatment of hockey player).  169. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 659. 
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Moreover, it is certainly the case that the Pilot Insurance court does 
not offer a view of the institutional role that punitive damages should 
play in, for example, the bad faith insurance context.  It is arguable that 
courts are neither well equipped nor well advised to attempt to regulate 
the insurance industry through the awarding of punitive damages.170  Be this as it may, it is clearly the case that the Pilot Insurance court took the 
plunge of recognizing punitive damages for pure breach of contract 
without any indication of the consequences of doing so at the level of 
institutional design.  Nor did the court consider the relevance of systemic 
issues within the industry in question with respect to the awarding of 
punitive damages in a particular case and with respect to issues of 
quantum.  On matters such as these, Canadian courts will no doubt be 
looking southward in the years to come for inspiration and wisdom. 
 
 
 170. For a clear statement of the view that they are neither, see John Swan, Punitive 
Damages for Breach of Contract: A Remedy in Search of a Justification, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 596, 628–34 (2004). 
